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Researchers have recognized that foreign firms possess both advantages and costs in 
operating in host countries. The extant literature suggests that the liability of foreignness can 
be gradually overcome as a foreign subsidiary learns more about the host country 
environment and develops better connections to local business networks. Based on a 
longitudinal case study of the Chinese management software industry, however, we find that 
even over the long term foreign firms continue to face difficulties in accessing some 
important potential country-specific advantages to overcome liability of foreignness. We 
develop a framework to explain why and how local firms more successfully access country-
specific advantages at home because of their local complementary knowledge, local 
relationships, and home-focused strategies and understand the dynamic of assets and liability 
of foreignness. These findings have important implications for the persistence of liability of 
foreignness and for established MNEs wishing to compete in emerging markets as well as 














The theory of the MNE suggests that firms investing overseas are assumed to have both 
superior firm-specific advantages (FSAs) and additional costs compared to domestic firms 
(Caves, 1996; Hymer, 1976). An MNE is able to achieve a satisfactory economic 
performance only if it can build and transfer some type of FSAs to foreign markets when 
facing additional costs. The advantages of foreignness (such as the advanced technology, 
management skills, and brand name) originate from the proprietary assets which have been 
analyzed and classified in much more detail by scholars espousing a resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Rugman & Verbeke, 2001; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997).       
 MNEs face additional costs that can adversely affect the performance and survival of 
their foreign subsidiaries compared to domestic firms (Bell, Filatotchev, & Rasheed, 2012; 
Campbell, Eden, & Miller, 2012; Kronborg & Thomsen, 2009; Mata & Portugal, 2002; 
Mezias, 2002; Salomon & Wu, 2012; Tallman, 1992). Zaheer (1995:341) termed these costs 
the “liability of foreignness” (LOF) arising “from the unfamiliarity of the environment, from 
cultural, political, and economic differences, and from the need for coordination across 
geographic distance, among other factors”. There are three key sources of LOF (Goerzen, 
Asmussen, & Nielsen, 2013; Zaheer, 1995): the first is the challenges directly associated with 
spatial distance and coordination over distance and across time zones, yielding an overall 
complexity of operations; the second is the firm-specific costs based on a particular 
company's uncertainty due to lack of familiarity within a local environment; and the final 
costs resulting from discrimination within the host-country environment stemming from 
economic nationalism and the lack of legitimacy of foreign firms.  
 In the meanwhile, the theory of the MNE also states that in addition to the FSAs that 
distinguish the differential performance between MNEs and local firms, local firms also 




possess advantages that arise from their favourable access to country-specific advantages 
(CSAs) (Hymer, 1976; Nachum, 2003). Hymer is explicit in emphasizing that local firms 
enjoy favourable access to the CSAs in their home countries, arising from reasonable and 
unreasonable preferences by employees and investors towards their own country firms. 
Hennart (2012) also points out that CSAs are not equally available to all firms, and MNEs 
have higher transaction costs to access CSAs in host countries than local firms. The CSAs 
that favourably accessed by local firms can strengthen LOF (Nachum, 2003). 
 The next logical question is whether MNEs can improve their access to the full 
complement of potential CSAs to overcome initial LOF over time. This is a central question 
in the LOF literature. It is widely believed among scholars and practitioners that MNEs can 
gradually overcome their initial LOF as their foreign subsidiaries learn more about the host 
country environment and develops better connections to local business networks (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Miller & Eden, 2006; Nachum, 2003; Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997). Johanson and Vahlne (1977) explained that the knowledge of 
international operations can be accumulated through operations abroad, and the acquired 
knowledge enables the foreign subsidiary to make more informed decisions in a host country. 
Kostova and Zaheer (1999) suggested that as time passes, a foreign subsidiary is likely to 
learn about the institutional environment and how to deal with it, and the local environment is 
also likely to accrue information about the particular subsidiary and begin to judge it more 
correctly. Miller and Eden (2006) contended that market experience is positively related to 
foreign subsidiary performance. Nachum (2003) even posited that experienced foreign 
financial service firms operating in the City of London do not suffer the LOF to the extent 
suggested by theory.  
 In this paper we set out to examine one setting that is inconsistent with these 
theoretical arguments - the management software industry in China. It appears as if in certain 




service industry in a large and complex host country such as China, MNEs face persistent 
LOF even over a long period of time. SAP and Oracle both entered China in the early 1990s, 
attracted by the market size and potential of its country-specific resources. In the beginning 
SAP and Oracle dominated the Chinese market. As of 2014, however, Chinese firms Yonyou 
and Kingdee were the No. 1 and No. 3 in this industry, with SAP and Oracle slipping to No. 2 
and No. 4 in terms of market share1. Once they faced serious competition from local firms it 
appears that SAP and Oracle suffered from a LOF compared with their Chinese challengers. 
Moreover, it appears that at least some dimensions of the initial LOF faced by SAP and 
Oracle in China have not diminished decades later. This has resulted in declining 
performance relative to their major local competitors in the Chinese market who have 
successfully accessed critical CSAs.  
 This evidence suggests that there remain significant gaps in our understanding of the 
relationship between potential CSAs and extant LOF theory. Specifically, although scholars 
accept that differential uptake of CSAs does happen, "why" and "how" differential 
access/uptake of CSAs happens remains poorly understood. Furthermore, the dynamic of 
assets and liability of foreignness in the long run needs to be further examined. Using our 
longitudinal study of the Chinese management software industry from the early 1990s to the 
early 2010s, we aim to examine those questions. We provide a framework to help explain 
why and how MNEs face persistent LOF in large and complex foreign markets centring on: 
(1) differences in firms' local complementary knowledge; (2) local relationships differ 
between firms; and (3) of home-focused strategies adopted by local firms versus HQ-posed 
strategies adopted by MNEs. Taken together, we hope to provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of why and how CSAs in emerging markets are not always freely or fully 
accessible to all firms, and the behaviour of LOF over time.  
                                                 
1 Source: Macquarie Research, April 2016 




 Our research makes several contributions. First, our study takes a first step to examine 
the micro-foundations of the dynamic of assets and liability of foreignness and understand 
why and how this happens based on a longitudinal case study. We develop a series of 
propositions as to why local companies outperform MNEs over time and why they are likely 
to access more CSAs because of their local complementary knowledge, local relationships, 
and home-focused strategies. These propositions provide a plausible explanation of the 
evidence for differential sources of advantages between local firms and MNEs in the Chinese 
management software industry. Using this fine-grained, longitudinal case methodology, our 
study, therefore, advances the LOF theory and the "location" dimensions of Dunning’s (1980; 
1998) eclectic model by comparing it with new empirical evidence. 
Second, we add a new perspective on the extant literature that postulates that the LOF 
can be gradually overcome over time. The extant literature argues that the initial LOF is 
expected to be gradually overcome because a foreign subsidiary learns more about the host 
country environment and develops better connections to local business networks (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 1977; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Miller & Eden, 2006; Nachum, 2003; Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997). Our study shows that there are circumstances in which some aspects of 
the LOF are difficult to overcome even in the long run because MNEs continue to face 
difficulties in accessing critical CSAs in service industries when direct interaction with 
clients is require, as opposed to placing goods in stores; and in large and complex host 
countries where the coverage of the market requires hundreds of local service sites, internal 
adaptation, and adjustment to strong local and national institutions. 
Third, our study also contributes to the global strategy literature (Bartlett, 1991; 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Rugman, Verbeke, & Yuan, 2011). The extant literature argues 
that to compete in the global market requires finding the appropriate trade-off between global 
integration and local responsiveness for MNEs to compete in the global market (Bartlett & 




Ghoshal, 1989). This means that the potential to access some potentially significant CSA’s in 
local markets is surrendered in order to exploit global FSAs. Our results suggest that the 
opportunity costs of failing to access these potential CSAs can be high. In order to properly 
take account of the costs of this lost opportunity it may be more appropriate to focus on 
trading off local integration (and its benefits in improved access to CSAs) against the costs of 
greater global responsiveness (adjusting the processes, routines and rule that embody global 
FSAs to meet the needs of local conditions) as suggested by Santos and Williamson (2015). 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by explaining our qualitative case study 
research methodology. In the next section we report findings from the case studies of the 
Chinese management software industry. We then develop six propositions from these 
longitudinal case studies to explain why local firms in Chinese management software 
industry might be more capable of accessing strategic CSAs in their home environment than 
foreign MNEs and whether MNEs can overcome initial LOF over time. These propositions 
centre on local firms’ superior complementary knowledge, the nature of local relationships 
with suppliers and government, and their home-focused strategies which are different from 
MNEs' HQ-posed strategies. We conclude by outlining the possible contributions of the 
present study to existing theory and practice and suggestions for future research. 
 
METHODS AND DATA 
 
In seeking to answer the questions of  "why" and "how" firms have differential access to 
CSAs and the dynamic of assets and liability of foreignness we rely on inductive theory 
building using case study. We believe the adoption of this approach is particularly 
appropriate to our research questions. The case study approach has acknowledged advantages 
in addressing “why” and “how” questions (Yin, 2003), and can “investigate a contemporary 




phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 2003). A case study can serve as "a 
talking pig" to allow a reader to see the world, and not just the literature, in a new way 
(Siggelkow, 2007). Case studies, like experiments, can be generalised to form theoretical 
propositions. The goal of adopting the explanatory case study research to test theory is to 
expand and generalise theories (analytic generalisation) and not to enumerate frequencies 
(statistical generalisation). 
We chose multiple case study methodology because it has proven particularly 
effective in developing new theory from consistent patterns within case data using replication 
logic in which each case serving to confirm (or disconfirm) the emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989, 2007; Gibbert, Ruigrok, & Wicki, 2008; Martin, 2011). Moreover, multiple case 
studies are more likely to yield more generalized, robust, and parsimonious theory than 
single-case studies (Langley, 1999; Yin, 2003). Specifically, by comparing MNEs and local 
firms in China in the same industry and overlapping market segments we are able to examine 
the LOF as it impacts differential ability to access potential CSAs and its evolution over time. 
 
Data Collection  
 We conducted a field study using observations, interviews, and archival data such as 
internal documents, annual reports, websites, and news articles in order to triangulate the data 
and so improve the accuracy of the picture emerging (Jick, 1979). Research sites were 
selected to achieve a diverse sample to enable richer theory development (Glaser & Strauss, 
1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). We aimed to analyse a sufficient number of case studies and 
range of industries to be fairly confident that the results had some general applicability while 
limiting the sample so as to enable in-depth interviews within a tractable timescale. 
 Our sample includes two MNEs with significant activities and experience in China 
(SAP and Oracle) and two of the leading local Chinese competitors (Yonyou and Kingdee) 




who were established in China by local entrepreneurs and have built their market position 
over several decades (Table 1). The data for these case studies were obtained from several 
primary and secondary sources. One of the authors has worked in the Chinese management 
software industry for six years, which allowed observation of in-depth daily business and 
competition in the industry and the collection of rich first-hand data. He also had access to 
many colleagues with work experience in Oracle China, SAP China, Yonyou, and Kingdee, 
including several contacts who worked as senior managers with Kingdee and Yonyou in 
1990s. That author attended several management software industry conferences during that 
period, observing competitor activities and listening to public speeches by corporate 
executives of Oracle China, SAP China, Yonyou, and Kingdee. 
 
<<< Insert Table 1 about here >>> 
 
By the end of the research programme we were successful in conducting two rounds 
of interviews across all four companies. The first round of interviews was conducted between 
June 2011 and May 2012 and a second round between December 2013 and March 2014. The 
second round of interviews complemented the first by asking follow-up and clarification 
questions. In some cases were we were able to secure interviews with multiple individuals; 
here we tried to gain perspectives from employees drawn from different levels in the 
corporate hierarchy or multiple business units, making a total of 35 semi-structured 
interviews. We started the interviews by asking background questions such as the name of the 
informant, their role in their firm, and how many years have he/she worked with their firm. 
We encouraged informants to provide more details when their descriptions were brief or 
when novel strands of narrative emerged (Martin & Eisenhardt, 2010; Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). Interviews commonly lasted for between 30 minutes to two hours. Interview notes 




were written down immediately after each interview, normally within 24 hours.  
 
Data Analysis 
We used within-case and cross-case analyses following recommendations for multiple 
case studies (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994). We started by writing up 
individual cases that triangulated all of our data including observations, interviews, 
documents (Jick, 1979). The importance of within-case analysis is driven by one of the 
realities of case study research - an overwhelming volume of data. We began within-case 
analysis in which customer-oriented process was the unit of analysis, developing preliminary 
concepts and a rough theoretical explanation for the preconditions of disruptive innovation. 
Detailed individual case write-ups for each site gave us a deep familiarity with each case 
which, in turn, accelerated cross-case comparison.   
After that we conducted a cross-case analysis using replication logic across firms, 
treating each firm as a case. During the cross-case analysis we probed for alternative 
theoretical relationships and constructs that might fit the data better than our initial emergent 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Gilbert, 2005). We also used tables and graphs to refine the 
constructs and theoretical relationships (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Some of novel 
conceptual constructs and new theoretical relationships were revised or deleted if we found 
they did not replicate across the cases. Using replication logic, we stopped data analysis until 
we reached a strong match between emergent theory and the empirical data. 
 
CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
 
We first provide a brief overview of the Chinese management software industry over the 
twenty-year period from early 1990s to early 2010s. Leading MNEs (such as SAP and Oracle) 
entered the Chinese management software market in the early 1990s, attracted by the market 




size and potential of its country-specific resources. In the beginning SAP and Oracle 
dominated the sector as no local Chinese firms were able to provide integrated management 
software. In late 1990s, with the surge of market demand for integrated management software, 
local firms started to develop Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)2 systems. In 2002 local 
firms first overtook MNEs in terms of gross market share in the Chinese management 
software sector, according to China Computer World Research3. By 2014, Chinese firms 
Yonyou and Kingdee were No. 1 (23%) and No. 3 (8%) in this industry, with SAP and Oracle 
slipping to No. 2 (11%) and No. 4 (5%) respectively in terms of market share4. 
 In terms of technological knowledge, SAP and Oracle are still the global leaders. 
Starting with almost no technological knowledge, how could local Chinese firms surpass 
MNEs in the Chinese management software industry? Our case study evidence points to the 
likelihood of systematic differences between the capabilities and behaviour of MNEs and 
local firms which can be expected to impact the extent to which they successfully exploit the 
potential of CSAs available in a particular market. By analysing these differences, we 
develop a set of propositions about the likely superiority of local firms in accessing potential 
CSAs in their home market, compared with MNEs operating there. Specifically, we postulate 
that systematic differences in the capabilities to access CSAs between local firms and MNEs 
can be explained by three main (non mutually exclusive) variables: differences in local 
complementary knowledge, differences in local relationships, and different strategies 
between local firms versus MNEs in a particular location (Table 2). Drawing on our 
longitudinal observations we further postulate that this LOF faced by MNEs shows little sign 
                                                 
2 ERP is a suite of integrated management software applications, including components such as accounting and 
finance management, human resource management, distribution management, manufacturing management, 
customer services management, and procurement management. 
3 Source: Report on management software sector in China, China Computer World Research, 2009. China 
Computer World, a joint venture magazine between IDG (a leading IT media based in the US) and Chinese 
Ministry of Science and Technology, is a top IT magazine in China. 
4 Source: China Internet and Software, Macquaire Research, April 2016 
 




of reducing in respect of their ability to access certain types of important potential CSAs. 
 
<<< Insert Table 2 about here >>> 
 
The initial assets and liability of foreignness from early 1990s to late 1990s 
Established MNEs started to enter the Chinese management software market in early 1990s. 
Oracle entered the Chinese market in 1991, establishing a wholly-owned subsidiary in 
Beijing. SAP setup a wholly-owned subsidiary in Beijing in 1995. In the very early stage of 
entry SAP and Oracle hired some highly skilled Chinese ERP system consultants (a factor 
condition), albeit at high cost, to provide their products and services to the high-end 
customers (a demand condition) in the Chinese market. Their first clients in China were 
subsidiaries or joint ventures of western multinationals, as well as some of the largest 
Chinese multinationals. For example, Oracle's client list included Motorola China, Ford 
China, Huawei, and Baidu; while some of SAP's clients were Procter & Gamble China, 
Kodak China, Lenovo, and Haier. SAP and Oracle dominated the Chinese management 
software market in early-late 1990s, because no Chinese companies were able to provide 
suitable management software. 
 
Proposition 1. MNEs outperform local firms in Chinese management software industry in 
the early stage of entry because the FSAs possessed by MNEs eliminate the LOF. 
 
The dynamic assets and liability of foreignness from late 1990s to early 2010s 
Recognizing the fast growing market of management software, Chinese companies started to 
develop their own management software products in late 1990s. Yonyou began to develop 
ERP system in 1996, and released their first ERP system called U8 (targeting SMEs) in 1997, 




based on Microsoft's .Net architecture. In 1998 Yonyou also began developing another ERP 
product, its NC (New Century) system targeting large enterprises. Kingdee started to develop 
their ERP system K/3 in 1997, also based on Microsoft's technology. Surprisingly, in 2002 
local management software suppliers surpassed MNEs in terms of market share in the 
Chinese market. By 2014, the gap between leading Chinese firms and MNEs widened as 
Yonyou had 23% of market share compared to 11% occupied by SAP. 
 
The relative FSAs possessed by local firms compared to MNEs 
Starting from late 1990s, local firms have tried to develop their own FSAs to compete with 
MNEs through locally appropriate innovation effects and learning from leading IT firms. 
Yonyou has invested heavily in locally-appropriate innovation activities to develop optimized 
ERP products for local customers. In 1997 Yonyou released their first ERP system called U8 
(targeting SMEs), based on Microsoft’s .Net architecture. However some components, such 
as the Manufacturing Management, were not so well developed. In 2001 Wang acquired 
Hankang, a leading ERP supplier based in Taiwan. The Manufacturing Management 
component in Hankang’s ERP system absorbed the best practices of the manufacturing 
industry in Taiwan, one of the most advanced manufacturing centres in the world. The 
acquisition also obtained a strong R&D team from Hankang based in Nanjing, China. In 2000 
Yonyou also formed strategic alliance with Microsoft which provided the .NET framework 
and technical support. By learning and absorbing best practices and technologies from 
Hangkang and Microsoft, in November 2004 Yonyou released U860, which smoothly 
combined comprehensive front and back office business management functions including 
Manufacturing Management, Financial Management, System Platform, and Supply Chain 
Management. U860 soon became a bestselling ERP system for SMEs in the Chinese market. 
 Apart from U8, since 1998 Yonyou has also been developing another ERP product 




NC (New Century) system targeting large enterprises. The sector at that time was dominated 
by foreign MNEs such as SAP and Oracle. In the late 1998 the first version of NC was 
released, based on the J2EE architecture5 and supporting Database systems such as DB2, 
Oracle and SQL Server, which was the first large ERP system developed by a Chinese 
company. In 2002 Yonyou established a partnership with Baan, a leading ERP supplier from 
the Netherlands with more than 15,000 customers in 60 countries around the world. The 
strength of NC at that time was Financial Management and Human Resource Management, 
while Baan’s expertise was in Manufacturing Management and Customer Relation 
Management. This partnership enabled Yonyou to learn and absorb advanced technologies 
and best practices from a leading global ERP supplier. Yonyou also established a strategic 
alliance with IBM. As a leader in J2EE technology6, IBM played a key role in encouraging 
Yonyou to develop the NC system based on the J2EE platform. In 2005, Yonyou officially 
quit the development its own middleware 7  and adopted IBM’s middleware product 
WebSphere in the NC product. NC 5.0 was released in 2006 and dramatically improved 
performance by working side-by-side with IBM’s HiPODS (High Performance On Demand 
Solutions) team and technical experts at IBM’s China Development Lab and Innovation 
Centres. NC 5.0 was able to provide flexibility and options for companies of various sizes 
and organisational structures. By 2008, after 10 years of continuous research and 
development, NC had been implemented in more than 2,500 large enterprises, including 60% 
of the top500 Chinese enterprises. 
 Kingdee has also focused on locally-appropriate innovation efforts to create optimized 
ERP system for local customers. Similarly to Yonyou, Kingdee started to develop ERP 
                                                 
5Java 2 Platform, Enterprise Edition or J2EE is a widely used platform for server programming in the Java 
programming language.  
6IBM, Oracle and BEA were advocates of the J2EE technology, competing with Microsoft’s .NET Framework.  
Oracle acquired BEA and Sun in 2008 and 2009 respectively. 
7Middleware is the computer software that connects software components with their applications, and consists 
of a set of services that allows multiple processes running on one or more machines to interact.  




system K/3 in 1997. Kingdee encountered huge difficulties since core components such as 
Manufacturing Management and Supply Chain Management could only be improved step by 
step, through working with clients and absorbing best practices from various industries. In 
2001, soon after Kingdee offered IPO on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, the company 
acquired CASE, a leading ERP supplier established in 1990 in Beijing. CASE had 
accumulated experience in the ERP field for 10 years and their products TEEMS (Total 
Enterprise Electric Management Solutions) had been implemented in many mid-large 
enterprises in China. Kingdee also formed a strategic alliance with Microsoft to help solve 
technological problems. By learning from CASE and Microsoft, the performance of K/3 
improved dramatically and it became a leading ERP system in China.  
 Kingdee has also been developing a large ERP system named EAS (Enterprise 
Application Suite). Before we explain the development process of the large ERP system EAS, 
we first need to introduce their middleware product Apusic. Kingdee decided to develop a 
J2EE-based middleware in house after Mr Yuan, their chief architect, studied hundreds of 
pages of J2EE standard which was open sourced. Mr Yuan was recognised as one of the “top 
20 most influential people in the Chinese software industry” 8 . He thought the available 
middleware products on the market at that time were not good enough. As no one else in 
Kingdee was able to understand the latest Java technologies as well as Yuan, he had to work 
almost alone on the core components. After about two years, Yuan developed the first version 
of Apusic, containing about 100,000 lines of code. In December 2000, Kingdee released 
Apusic 1.0. In the next several years, Apusic was the first middleware product developed by a 
Chinese company to pass the J2EE 1.3 and J2EE 1.4 certification. In 2006, shortly after J2EE 
1.5 was announced, Apusic 5.0 was the No. 4 middleware product in the world to pass the 
certification, only behind leading middleware applications such as IBM’s Websphere and 
                                                 
8 The top 20 list includes Mr Kaifu Li (ex-CEO of Google China), Mr Lei Ding (CEO of NetEase; NASDAQ: 
NTES), and Mr Tianqiao Cheng (CEO of Shanda; NASDAQ: SNDA). 




Oracle’s Weblogic. In 2010, Kingdee became the first Chinese Platinum member of the Open 
Group and had a seat on the Open Group's governing board, which was in charge of 
developing J2EE standards.  
 Kingdee’s large ERP system EAS was developed based on Apusic and TEEMS 
acquired from CASE. TEEMS was regarded as an excellent ERP system based on two 
reasons. First, TEEMS was developed based on the latest J2EE technologies. Secondly, 
TEEMS’s components not only included Finance Management, Manufacturing Management, 
and Supply Chain Management, but also Office Automation, Knowledge Management, and 
E-Business Management, all of which had been implemented and tested in numerous Chinese 
firms in their day-to-day business. Kingdee started to develop EAS in 2003, and by 2010 
EAS had been implemented in several hundred large Chinese enterprises, many of which 
were listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange.    
 Of course, in terms of FSAs such as technological knowledge, as global market 
leaders SAP and Oracle still remained well ahead of Chinese companies such as Yonyou and 
Kingdee (which remains the case today). Based on our case evidence, however, local firms 
have managed to narrow the gap of FSAs between themselves and MNEs. These 
considerations lead us to posit that: 
 
Proposition 2. The gap of FSAs between local firms and MNEs narrowed over time in 
Chinese management software industry after local firms  started to develop their own FSAs 
through locally appropriate innovation effects and learning from leading firms. 
 
The relative CSAs possessed by local firms compared to MNEs 
Local firms have also accessed critical CSAs over time. Potential CSAs include not only 
Ricardian type endowments - such as land, labour, capital, but also aspects of the legal and 




commercial environment in which the firm is based, such as market structure, government 
legislation and policies (Dunning, 1980). In the seminal book the Competitive Advantage of 
Nations, Porter (1990) argued that CSAs could be classified into six categories: ‘factor 
conditions’, ‘demand conditions’, ‘related and supporting industries’, ‘firm strategy, structure, 
and rivalry’, ‘the role of chance’, and ‘the role of government’, a classification that has been 
widely adopted (Rugman & Collinson, 2009; Rugman, Oh, & Lim, 2012). These CSAs will 
shape the information that firms have available to perceive opportunities and the pools of 
inputs, skills and knowledge they can draw on. The national diamond provides an effective 
and convenient way of classifying CSAs (Rugman & Collinson, 2009), and we will follow 
Porter’s classification for analytical purposes in this study. Yonyou and Kingdee have 
accessed all the six types of CSAs, as discussed below. 
 Factor conditions. Access to an effective and efficient distribution network is an 
important factor condition for companies to profit from innovation (Hennart, 2009; Teece, 
1986). Yonyou and Kingdee had better local complementary knowledge such as where best 
to locate sales offices and an understanding of the business models of local distributors. 
Using this complementary knowledge enable them to establish wider and more effective 
distribution networks than our sample MNEs in China. By 2002, Yonyou and Kingdee had 
established dozens of offices in major cities in China, compared to several offices (only in 1st 
tier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai) established by SAP and Oracle. Furthermore, based 
on their superior knowledge of the geographic distribution of potential customers, both 
Yonyou and Kingdee extended and strengthened their distribution networks by establishing 
strategic alliances with hundreds of local firms, covering not only 1st tier cities, but also 2nd 
and 3rd tier cities in China. In contrast, SAP and Oracle only established partnerships with a 
few dozen well-known local firms in a limited number of cities. The much larger distribution 
reach of Yonyou and Kingdee allowed them to better access and leverage potential Chinese 




market CSAs through access to a distribution network that connected them more closely to 
local market demand, allowing them to respond faster to local customer requirements and 
provide prompt customer service. 
 SAP China and Oracle China followed global standards when establishing strategic 
alliances. These included provisions that their partners should have the ability to significantly 
enhance the value of the products/services (such as developing plug-in components); that 
their partners had to make a minimum investment in buying their ERP products; and were 
restricted to serving clients in a prescribed business sector. Yonyou and Kingdee, by contrast, 
had the knowledge required to adjust to the needs and aspirations of local distributors and 
applied rules more flexibly when these threatened to impede the formation of potentially 
valuable distribution relationships. Moreover, Yonyou and Kingdee attracted/motivated local 
partners by allowing outstanding partners to become their local subsidiaries (with the CEO of 
the partner becoming the general manager of the subsidiary), something that corporate 
policies within SAP and Oracle made impossible.  
 Demand conditions. Local firms also had better local complementary knowledge of 
the structures of large Chinese companies that allowed them to develop and optimize large 
ERP systems to meet their specific needs. For example, in 1998 Yonyou began developing its 
large ERP system named NC (New Century) targeting large enterprises. The main advantage 
of the NC system compared to SAP or Oracle is its superior performance in managing 
conglomerate structures (especially conglomerates formed through unrelated diversification). 
Because many large Chinese companies are very diversified (often across unrelated 
businesses), they need ERP systems that can manage the processes and finance of their 
numerous unrelated diversification business units. The ERP systems offered by SAP or 
Oracle, however, do not have such functionality because conglomerates of unrelated 
businesses are rare in Western countries. 




 Related and supporting industries. Close local relationships are important for the local 
firms to access related and supporting industries. Porter (1990) suggested that the nation's 
companies benefit most when the suppliers are, themselves, global competitors. For example, 
it is widely recognized that the Manufacturing Management component in SAP's ERP system 
is the world’s  best because it embodies best practices gleaned from working with the world-
leading German manufacturing industry. Likewise access to the leading financial industry in 
the U.S. helped Oracle develop the advanced world’s most competitive financial management 
component in their ERP system. While China has become the world factory in recently years, 
her competitiveness arises from different strategies and capabilities from firms in developed 
countries. Chinese firms have developed superior capabilities in offering adequate products at 
low cost, variety at low cost, and in rapidly moving down the experience curve by scale up 
new technologies and turn niche manufacturing into volume production (Zeng & Williamson, 
2007). Co-development with Chinese manufacturing industry allowed Yonyou and Kingdee 
to design a unique Manufacturing Management component in their ERP system that precisely 
met the needs of Chinese customers. As a senior manager in Yonyou put it: 
 
Our CEO, Mr. Wang, has a close "guanxi" with our customers and visit them frequently. In the summer of 1996, 
Wang visited Dongguan in Guandong province, which was one of the most developed regions in China. As 
usual Wang met with local customers and partners to discuss the performance of their accounting software, 
which dominated the Chinese market. However, the conversions shocked Wang as many customers, especially 
those serving as suppliers for foreign multinationals, preferred to buy ERP systems which manage not only 
accounting and finance but also the manufacturing processes. Wang realised that the demand for ERP systems 
would increase dramatically. When he returned to Beijing, Wang reported his findings in the board meeting and 
decided to start developing an ERP system including the Manufacturing Management component meeting the 
specific needs of Chinese manufacturing companies. 
 
 Because SAP China and Oracle China had close relationships with related and 




supporting industries in their home countries rather than in host countries, the lacked the 
complementary knowledge to optimise their ERP to the needs of the local business network 
in China. 
 Firm strategy, structure, and rivalries. Porter (1990) suggested that firm strategy, 
structure and rivalry is one of the six key CSAs, and that national circumstances and context 
create strong tendencies in how companies set their strategies, how companies are organized 
and managed, and the nature of domestic rivalry. The strategies and structures adopted by 
local firms and MNEs are very different because local firms' strategy is more focused on their 
domestic market while MNEs' strategies are heavily influenced by their HQ and their 
experiences in their own home markets. 
 Initially both SAP and Oracle adopted strategies that emphasised leveraging the 
capabilities and resources developed in their home markets as their primary source of 
competitive advantage in China. This reflected both the understandable quest to leverage 
their perceived international strengths in China adopting organisational models that 
approximated what Bartlett & Goshal (2002) termed the global firm as the most efficient 
structure through which to transfer, control and exploit their global capabilities. In 
consequence, both MNEs chose to a differentiation strategy that involved offering 
technologically advanced, complex ERP systems at premium prices. These products were 
customised versions of those sold in advanced markets with the result that they often lacked 
the functionality to meet the specific needs of Chinese customers. Customisation was limited 
both by the cost and up-front investment required by an assumption that new ideas and 
developments all came from the parent. As a senior manager in Oracle China put it: 
 
We are one of the best software companies in the world and we aim to offer similar products and services across 
the world. We do not compete with Chinese rivals in terms of low price. We aim to employ the best consultants 
and specialists [at high cost] providing high technology products to our clients. 





This strategy was not necessarily wrong: it was arguably the best way for the MNEs 
to exploit their global competitive advantages. But it did come at a cost of reducing SAP and 
Oracle’s ability to access potential CSAs associated with demand conditions in the Chinese 
market. 
In contrast, although Yonyou and Kingdee started to penetrate foreign markets 
(mainly in Asia, such as Japan, Thailand, and Hong Kong) in the mid-2000s, China long 
remained their most important market and their business and organisational models were 
centred in China. In consequence, their strategy was to offer a broad range of ERP systems 
including, low-cost ERP solutions for SMEs as well as large ERP systems aimed at large 
customers in the high-end segment. They also developed specific finance and human-
resources components in their ERP systems to meet the distinctive needs of Chinese 
customers. As a result of these strategies, the local competitors were better able to access and 
leverage the potentially positive CSAs associated with the large and growing, but diverse 
demand conditions in the Chinese market. 
 Differences in strategies between the MNEs and local competitors, reinforced by 
different organisational structures and responsibilities, therefore, mean that local competitors 
were more successful in accessing and leveraging the potential CSAs associated with demand 
condition in the Chinese market. 
 The role of government. Local firms had better complementary knowledge to 
understand the local regulations and institutions (the role of government) compared to MNEs. 
Unlike western accounting standards, Chinese accounting standards are less focused on 
measuring profit and loss and more directed to measuring the inventory of assets available to 
a company (reflecting their roots in record keeping during socialist period). A Chinese 
balance sheet, for example, does not include the debts that a corporation owes, and are more 




suitable for management control than for tax purposes. Similarly, management of the labour 
force external relationships, and social insurance in China also differ greatly from Western 
practices. For example, the financial reports application in the financial management 
component of the ERP developed by Yonyou was the first application to be certified by the 
government, and became the quasi national standard soon thereafter. Yonyou not only 
understood the regulations and institutions better than MNEs, it also became a rule maker by 
working closely with government authorities. Conversely, it was difficult for SAP or Oracle 
to gain such deep understand the local standards as deep as local firms because of their roots 
in Western countries.  
 The role of Chance. Close relationships and detailed and frequent interactions with a 
diverse range of local market participants increase the chances of beneficial insights through 
serendipity. It is therefore local firms who are more completely embedded into local networks 
that are best positioned  to benefit from the role of chance. Yonyou, for example, came to 
dominate the accounting software sector partly because of their founder’s (Mr. Wang) unique 
working opportunity in the State Council for several years. As Wang related in an interview 
with CCTV (China Central Television): 
 
In the early 1980s, most of the work in the finance department of the State Council had to be done manually, 
including collecting statics data from thousands of state-owned enterprises across China and generating reports 
from the data. Together with my colleagues, we suggested that the finance department should develop 
accounting software. The suggestion was soon approved and I was appointed as the leader for this project. In 
about 3 years, by working with a local software company, we released a high quality accounting software 
system. The accounting software passed the test performed by the Ministry of Finance and was thereafter 
implemented in over 100 organisations in the State Council. I realised the huge potential of commercialising the 
accounting software and suggested that the finance department should sell it publicly; however the finance 
department did not approve the proposal at that time as the State Council is a government organisation, not a 
commercial company. 
 
 Realizing the huge potential market of accounting software, Wang decided to leave 




the State Council to set up Yonyou. In 1989, Yonyou released their first product, accounting 
software UFO (User Friendly Office). In the next year, the DOS (Disk Operating System) 
version of UFO passed the test performed by the Ministry of Finance and became the first 
accounting software in China to receive a certificate from the government. Thereafter UFO 
was regarded as the official standard and quickly dominated the accounting software sector in 
China.  
 In summary, Yonyou and Kingdee leveraged superior local complementary 
knowledge that enabled them to access CSAs in the form of wide, well-adapted and 
committed distribution networks, and demand conditions such as latent local customer needs, 
better knowledge about local regulations and institutions, and closer integration with local 
networks compared with SAP and Oracle. Those CSAs can only be accessed and exploited 
by deploying complementary local knowledge about: the local culture and business customs 
of a region; local consumer demands and tastes; expectations and behaviour of the local 
labour force, the strategies and structures of local distributors, suppliers and ancillary 
industries (Makino & Delios, 1996). Most of this knowledge is experiential and context-
dependent (Doz, Santos, & Williamson, 2001). It so can only be amassed through the 
interactions among people with the programmes, operations or objects that are specific to a 
local context, such as a work practice in an organization (Yanow, 2004), often over an 
extended period of time. These forms of local knowledge and skills are also both location- 
and firm-specific in nature (Rugman & Verbeke, 1992). Because local firms and their staff 
have evolved their knowledge in their local environment (generally since birth), we would 
expect them to have more of this related local knowledge than MNEs (even compared with 
MNEs with substantial experience in the host country).  
 Our case studies also demonstrate that local relationships are critical to access CSAs 
associated with distribution, related and supporting industries, the role of government and the 




role of chance. Based on close working relationships, home-based related and supporting 
industries provide an advantage in innovation and upgrading (Porter, 1990). Because 
suppliers and end-users locate close to each other, they can benefit from short lines of 
communication, quick and constant flow of information and knowledge, and an ongoing 
exchange of ideas. The business environment can be viewed as a web of relationships with 
suppliers and end-users, and new knowledge and products are developed in close 
relationships (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). MNEs may suffer a “liability of outsidership” 
because they have a disadvantage relevant network position in host countries (Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009). 
 We also see in our cases evidence that local relationships are also essential to 
overcome institutional voids that must be bridged in order to access local CSAs (such as 
Yonyou’s relationship with the government that allowed its design to become the quasi-
national standard). These barriers are especially significant in emerging markets that are often 
characterised by highly imperfect markets, an inefficient judiciary, unpredictable and 
burdensome regulations, heavy bureaucracy, political instability or discontinuity in 
government policies (Ghemawat & Khanna, 1998; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Government 
policies may favour local firms over MNEs (Aggarval & Agmon, 1990), placing constraints 
on MNEs ability to access particular types of CSAs in a host country. In addition, imperfect 
markets and non-transparent and un-equal application and formulation of government policy 
may mean that certain CSAs can only be accessed in practice if a firm has relationships built 
up over a period of time. Likewise The absence of a well-established infrastructure, well-
developed market mechanisms, and a well-developed contracting and intellectual property 
rights regime creates particular difficulties for MNEs from developed countries, which are 
not experienced in handling such conditions (Prahalad & Lieberthal, 1998).  
 There are also considerable inter-group variation in the strategies adopted by 




individual firms among MNEs and local firms competing in any particular market. None the 
less, we can expect the modal points of these distributions to differ in systematic ways. 
Extant literature points to the trade-offs between global integration and local responsiveness 
as a key driver of MNEs strategies (Prahalad & Doz, 1987). This is because the ability to 
balance the benefits of internalising the transfer and arbitrage of common resources and 
capabilities against the costs of poorer fit with local market requirements lies at the core of 
MNEs competitive advantage (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002; Devinney, Midgley, & Venaik, 
2000; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). The strategic choices MNEs make will therefore impact the 
extent to which they seek to leverage the CSAs in a local market.  
    At one extreme, for MNEs adopting the global strategy and organisational model 
(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989), foreign subsidiaries will simply replicate their headquarters and 
compete in the local markets on the basis of FSAs transferred in from the headquarters. They 
do not develop additional FSAs adapting to the local business environments in host countries, 
and therefore those foreign subsidiaries lack the incentive to access CSAs in host countries. 
At the other extreme, for MNEs adopting the multi-domestic strategy and organisational 
model (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2002), foreign subsidiaries will focus more strongly on 
opportunities to access host-country CSAs. But their willingness to invest in accessing 
locally-specific FSAs will still be tempered, both by the costs and potential loss of perceived 
advantage associated with modifying their FSAs transferred from home and by the 
opportunity costs of host-country investment at the expense of investing in global or local 
activities at home. HQ-imposed strategies therefore tend to ignore or reduce MNEs' ability to 
access local CSAs in host countries. 
 Strategic choices by local firms (such as Yonyou and Kingdee), by contrast, are 
largely free of such trade-offs. Their home market will generally be their clear priority. 
Moreover, in seeking to build competitive advantage local firms will be strongly focused on 




the advantages of those available to them locally (CSAs) and especially those which can 
potentially provide differentiated advantages from those enjoyed by MNEs. These 
considerations lead us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Local firms will generally be more capable than MNEs in accessing CSAs at 
home because of their local complementary knowledge, local relationships, and home-
focused strategies, and these CSAs strengthen the LOF.  
 
 In early 2000s, facing the fierce competition from local Chinese firms, SAP and 
Oracle started to invest more in China in order to access more potential CSAs to compete 
with local companies. As a result, MNEs to some extent learned to access more CSAs over 
time. First, both SAP and Oracle established R&D centres in China in early 2000s to access 
skilled but low cost Chinese software engineers (a factor condition): SAP established a lab in 
Shanghai in 2003; Oracle also established R&D centres in Beijing and Shenzhen in 2002. In 
general software engineers would work with a company which pays the highest salary. A 
firm can employ labour, but cannot prevent it from leaving the firm (Zaheer & Nachum, 
2011). Low cost labour in emerging markets is one of the reasons for resource-seeking MNEs 
to operate abroad (Dunning, 1998; Makino, Lau, & Yeh, 2002). The advantages the MNEs 
gained by accessing the CSA, however, was limited by the fact that a significant percentage 
of the software engineers in those R&D centres, however, were part of the global teams 
developing and testing ERP systems for the international market, rather than the Chinese 
market in particular. 
 Second, SAP and Oracle also developed better knowledge of local demand conditions 
and started to customize their ERP products in early 2000s to meet the needs of SMEs in 
China. To address the increasing demand in the SME sector, SAP acquired a small ERP 




software company based in Israel and tried to sell a customised version (named SAP Business 
One) to Chinese customers. Similarly, Oracle also customized their ERP system (a simplified 
version of their large ERP system) for the SME sector. As a result, their market shares in the 
SME sector have increased to some extent but they have still not come close to matching the 
strength of local firms in this sector.  
 Third, recognizing the competitive deficiency both SAP and Oracle tried to access the 
market by adapting their strategies to emphasize more on local responsiveness. In early 2000s, 
the country president of SAP China, Mr. Klaus M. Zimmer, initiated a business plan “Fire” to 
increase their investment in China. Oracle also initiated a business plan called "Golden 
China" in early 2000s by their country president Mr. Andrew Hu to better engage with local 
customers and government. As part of these plans, MNEs expanded their distribution 
networks in China. By 2010 Oracle had expanded to 20 offices in China; while SAP had 7 
offices. They had also expanded their partnerships with a few hundred local firms. Also, in 
early 2000s Oracle started to negotiate with the local government to purchase a land and 
build their own office in Zhongguancun Software Park in Beijing. As the country president of 
Oracle China, Mr. Andrew Hu related in 2002: 
 
Building our office in Beijing shows our commitment to the Chinese market, and as a way to establish closer 
relationship with local government... I believe the [market] opportunities are in China in the next ten years.   
 
 These findings are consistent with the extant LOF literature, which argues that MNEs 
can gradually overcome their initial LOF as their foreign subsidiaries learn more about the 
host country environment and develops better connections to local business networks 
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Miller & Eden, 2006; Nachum, 2003; 
Zaheer & Mosakowski, 1997). SAP and Oracle have learned to access more CSAs in China 
such as the low cost Chinese software engineers, the market demand of the SME segment, 




wider distribution networks, and adapting their strategies to emphasize on local 
responsiveness. These considerations lead us to posit that: 
 
Proposition 4: MNEs can access more CSAs to overcome some of their initial LOF in 
Chinese management software industry to some extent as time passes because their foreign 
subsidiaries learn more about the host country environment and develops better connections 
to local business networks. 
 
 However, our case studies suggest that some LOF cannot be overcome even as time 
passes, so that SAP and Oracle still face persistent difficulties in accessing some critical 
CSAs. First, it has been difficult for SAP and Oracle to develop the local complementary 
knowledge necessary to access wider distribution networks matching to those enjoyed by 
Yonyou and Kingdee. As we have mentioned, by 2010 Oracle had expanded to 20 offices in 
China; while SAP had 7 offices. They had also expanded their partnerships with a few 
hundred local firms. Over the same period, however, Yonyou had established 100 offices in 
major cities across China; Kingdee had built 90 offices across China. Furthermore, both 
Yonyou and Kingdee extended and strengthened their distribution networks by establishing 
strategic alliances with literally thousands of local firms. Hennart (2009) explained that 
MNEs are prohibited from establishing a local distribution network in some cases. Even 
when this is permitted, it can be a difficult and lengthy process, as local customers may have 
formed strong bonds with existing local distributors. Although SAP and Oracle tried to access 
wider distribution networks overtime they were unable to achieve a speed of expansion 
comparable to Yonyou and Kingdee.  
 Second, it is difficult for MNEs to develop local relationships with local government 
and market participants. SAP and Oracle have faced difficulties in building "guanxi" (the 




system of social networks and influential relationships that underpins Chinese society) in 
China in order to access CSAs such as demand conditions, related and supporting industries 
as well as the role government because of their outsidership. Guanxi in China can act as a 
substitute for formal institutional support (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Such personal connections 
are particularly important to managers in countries without a stable legal and regulatory 
environment for conducting business (Redding, 1990; Zucker, 1986). However, it seems 
particularly difficult for outsiders to pass through this gate to become insiders due to the 
exclusiveness of guanxi networks (Gao, Ballantyne, & Knight, 2010; Wang, 2007). In 
contrast, as we have explained Yonyou and Kingdee have established very close "guanxi" 
with local government, customers, and distributors.  
 In some cases this continued outsidership is reinforced by regulations that prohibit 
MNEs from accessing certain markets because of local government's discrimination for 
foreign firms. For reasons of security and the  protection of the  local computer software 
industry the Chinese government has a policy to favour local software over that produced by 
MNEs. In 2004 the Chinese government published a regulation to restrict foreign software 
purchases. In 2015 the Chinese government dropped some of the world's leading technology 
brands from its approved state purchase lists, while adding thousands of locally made 
products, as a response to revelations of widespread western cyber surveillance.  
 Third, it has been very difficult for SAP and Oracle to completely change their HQ-
imposed strategies to optimize their ERP systems to meet the specific needs of Chinese 
customers (a demand condition). Because of the integrated nature of EPR systems optimizing 
can be a difficult and resource-intensive task. Finance and human resource routines, for 
instance, are deeply embedded in the complicated enterprise application software so that 
changing the functionality in these necessitates changes in many parts of the ERP software. 
As a senior development manager in Oracle noted: 





All the management software developed by Oracle are targeting the global market. The different needs of local 
customers in different countries are supported by adding functionalities as plugins to the software system [while 
the main functionalities do not change]. For example, in our ERP system we have plugins connecting Facebook 
for the US customers as well as Wechat for the Chinese customers. When customers [no matter in which 
country] buy products from Oracle, they get exactly the same products including all the plugins. If customers do 
not need certain functionalities, all you need is to turn that functionalities off. For example, Chinese customers 
often turn off the plugins for Facebook when they implement our ERP system because Facebook is not 
accessible in China.  
  
 It may make sense for MNEs in seeking to preserve the FSAs they transfer from 
overseas, but the corollary is that they pay a substantial price in terms of constraining their 
ability to access CSAs in host countries. 
 Furthermore, in our case studies we found that the willingness of MNEs to invest in 
fully embracing the different demand conditions in China was limited, despite their shift 
toward increased local responsiveness. It seemed that in the eyes of senior executives back at 
headquarters, the Chinese market could not justify shifting investments from major markets 
such as the USA, Europe, and Japan. Therefore, although their subsidiaries initiated plans to 
seize the local opportunities and access CSAs in the Chinese market, commitment of 
necessary resources by the home country was often limited. To address the large and growing 
demand in the SME segment, for example, SAP acquired a small ERP software company 
based in Israel and tried to sell a customised version (SAP Business One) to Chinese 
customers instead of developing a fundamentally new product optimised for the Chinese 
market. The SAP Business One achieved little penetration. Potential customers stated that 
this was, in part, because it included modules for the management of large-scale 
manufacturing and automated customer relationship management – functions that were of 
limited interest to Chinese SMEs who were involved only in small-scale production or 
outsourced manufacturing and personalised customer interaction. Yet the product was weak 




on the two areas most relevant to Chinese SMEs: finance management and human resource 
management where it failed to accommodate the huge differences in the finance and human 
resource systems between China and foreign countries. 
Also, the role of country presidents of SAP and Oracle was different from that of 
CEOs in Chinese firms. In the latter, for example, Chinese CEOs were in charge of 
everything from R&D to sales and so their strategic responses were informed by an overview 
of the whole business.  When the sales divisions of the local competitors sensed new 
opportunities in the SME segment and reported to the CEO, the R&D division was promptly 
directed to develop specific products to address market demand. In Oracle China, by contrast, 
only the head of their sales unit reported to the president of Oracle China while its R&D 
centres in China reported directly to the R&D division in their headquarters located in the 
USA. As a result, he could encourage sales people to give greater emphasis to the SME 
segment, but was unable to re-focus the R&D priorities towards responding to the needs of 
this segment. These considerations lead us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: MNEs still face persistent difficulties in accessing some critical CSAs to 
overcome some dimensions of LOF over time in Chinese management software industry 
because it is difficult for MNEs to develop local complementary knowledge, establish close 
local relationships, and change their HQ-imposed strategies even over an extended period of 
time.  
 
 Taken together, while local firms have narrowed the gap of FSAs between themselves 
and MNEs, MNEs still face persistent difficulties to access some critical CSAs to overcome 
LOF in host countries. In terms of FSAs such as technological knowledge, SAP and Oracle 
are still ahead of local firms as they remain the global leaders today. However,  based on the 




foregone case studies, in some setting such as the management software industry in China, 
the differential capabilities to access some critical CSAs seem to have more explanation 
power for firm performance between local firms and MNEs. The management software 
industry is a service industry when direct interaction with clients is require, as opposed to 
placing goods in stores. China is a large and complex country where the coverage of the 
market requires hundreds of local service sites, internal adaptation, and adjustment to strong 
local and national institutions. In this setting CSAs have more explanatory power for the 
relative performance of local firms vs. MNEs than FSAs. These considerations lead us to 
posit that: 
 
Proposition 6: Local firms outperform MNEs over time in Chinese management software 
industry because the different CSAs possessed by local firms compared to MNEs have more 




Based on a detailed study of the Chinese management software sector from over a twenty-
year period from the early 1990s to the early 2010s, this research has enabled an in-depth 
investigation into the differential access to CSAs by MNEs and local firms and the dynamic 
of assets and liability of foreignness over time. Theoretically, while the extant literature has 
recognized that some CSAs are not freely and fully available to all firms operating in the 
same location (Hennart, 2009; Zaheer & Nachum, 2011), this paper offers a more nuanced 
picture of how and why some CSAs are not equally accessible to all firms. Furthermore, it is 
widely believed that MNEs can overcome initial LOF to access more potential CSAs over 
time in host countries (Miller & Eden, 2006; Nachum, 2003). By contrast, our study suggests 




that MNEs face persistent LOF to access some critical CSAs even as time passes. As a result, 
local firms outperform MNEs over time because they have accessed critical CSAs at home 
and also developed some FSAs to narrow the gap between those of MNEs. 
 Our study also has some interesting implications for practitioners. The first is that 
MNEs can benefit by paying more attention to formulating strategies and building 
complementary capabilities and knowledge to help them access potential CSAs in host 
countries. Twenty years ago, MNEs such as SAP and Oracle dominated the Chinese market 
in the ERP industry. But today, Chinese firms Yonyou and Kingdee are leading firms in 
China. The main reason is that the Chinese firms were able to access CSAs that MNEs were 
not able to access, such as extensive distribution networks, local latent demand and 
opportunities to leverage government relationships and institutions. Although MNEs may 
remain at a disadvantage to local firms in accessing CSAs as a result of less local knowledge, 
outsidership and the constraints associated with HQ-imposed strategies they can also improve 
their competitive strength by actions that improve their access to potential CSAs including 
hiring local executives who better understand local market opportunities, developing (not just 
customising) new products for local customers, and establishing close partnerships with local 
firms to access their distribution networks. 
 At the same time, we believe that the capabilities to access local CSAs are becoming a 
more important factor in global competition. It is possible that MNEs may outperform the 
local firms in spite of having the liabilities in accessing CSAs in certain industries. In this 
case one of the two conditions must hold: 1) the local CSAs do not confer much advantage; 
or 2) the FSAs that the MNEs bring are so overwhelming that it does not matter that they 
struggle to access the CSAs. However, with the globalisation of the world economy, it is now 
easier for local firms to access technologies and know-how through new gateways opening 
up in the form of: outsourcing, modularisation, codification of knowledge, and creating more 




open markets for international talent and corporate control (Santos & Williamson, 2015; 
Williamson & Yin, 2009). This trend means that the distinctive advantages that MNEs 
traditionally enjoy by efficiently transferring resources and capabilities across the world are 
becoming relatively less powerful as local firms access from alternative sources. Improved 
capabilities to access CSAs that are not freely and fully available to all firms will therefore 
become more critical to maintain MNEs' relative competitive advantage. 
 Although we are confident that the theory developed in this research should be 
general and not confined to service industries in emerging markets, given the relatively small 
sample size in this paper, further research designed to understand the differential access to 
CSAs and the dynamic of assets and liability of foreignness in different industries in both 
developed and developing countries would be worthwhile.  





































Interviews Public speeches 
Yonyou 1988 USD 1.09 billion 
(23%) 
9: 
Corporate executive: 1 
Directors and managers: 3 
Business unit informant: 5 
2 (CEO) 
SAP China 1995 USD 522 million 
(11%) 
5: 
Directors and managers: 2 
Business unit informant: 3 
1(Country 
president) 
Kingdee 1993 USD 380 million  
(8%) 
10: 
Corporate executive: 1 
Directors and managers: 6 
Business unit informant: 3 
2 (CEO) 
Oracle China 1991 USD 237 million 
(5%) 
11: 
Corporate executive: 2 
Directors and managers: 6 
Business unit informant: 3 
5(Country 
president) 
Total    35 (10) 
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Table 2. Differential access to CSAs in the Chinese management software industry 
 Differential access 
Abilities 
CSAs accessed in the early stage of entry  
(early 1990s to early 2000s) 
CSAs accessed over a long period of time  
(early 2000s to early 2010s) 
MNEs 
 
Limited local complementary knowledge: 
 Limited knowledge of establishing local 
distribution networks 
 limited knowledge of local customer needs 
 limited knowledge of local regulations and 
institutions 
Outsidership: 
 Limited relationships with related industries in 
host countries 
 Limited relationships with local government 
HQ-posed strategies 
 Similar ERP systems for customers across 
different countries 
 Global standards in selecting local distributors 
 One step implementation model 
 
1. Some skilled Chinese ERP consultants at 
high cost 
2. Some market share in the high-end 
segment. Customers including subsidiaries or 
joint ventures of western MNEs, and some 
large Chinese firms. 
3. Distribution networks with several offices 
in 1st tier cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, 
and dozens of local distributors. 
 
1. A large number of Chinese software engineers 
at low cost. A significant percentage of them, 
however, were part of the global teams 
developing and testing ERP systems for the 
international market, rather than the Chinese 
market in particular. 
2. R&D centers in cities such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Shenzhen. 
3. Limited market share in the low-end SMEs 
segment, and some market share in the high-end 
segment 
4. Distribution networks with dozens of offices 
and hundreds of local distributors 
5. Some relationships with local government. For 
example, Oracle built physical offices in China 
rather than renting offices in order to form closer 
relationships with local government. 
Local 
firms 
Local complementary Knowledge: 
 Superior knowledge of establishing local 
distribution networks 
 A deep understanding of Chinese customer 
needs 
 Rich knowledge of local regulations and 
institutions 
Close local relationships: 
 Close relationships ("guanxi") with related 
industries such as the manufacturing industry 
 Close relationships ("guanxi") with local 
government 
Home-focused strategies: 
 Developing optimized ERP systems meeting 
the specific needs of local customers 
 Flexible in selecting local distributors 
 ERP123 implementation model 
 
1. Wider, effective, and efficient distribution networks with more offices and distributors in China 
compared to MNEs because of local firms' complementary knowledge such as where to locate sales 
offices, an understanding of the geographic distribution of potential customers, and the superior 
knowledge required to adjust to the needs and aspirations of local distributors. 
2. Large market share in low-end and high-end segments by the ERP123 implementation model and 
ERP systems targeting conglomerate corporations because of local firms' complementary 
knowledge such as a deep understanding of Chinese customers and the knowledge of the structures 
of large Chinese conglomerate corporations. 
3. Benefited from the related and supporting industries at home and developed a unique 
Manufacturing Management component in their ERP system that precisely met the needs of 
Chinese customers by co-developing with Chinese manufacturing industry. 
4. Home-focused strategies to develop and optimize ERP systems for local customers 
5. Understood local regulations and institutions better than MNEs such as the knowledge to 
understand Chinese accounting standards with their roots in record keeping during socialist period, 
and better relationships with local government because of insidership. 
6. Local firms had the chance to first develop the accounting software which has become the quasi 
standard in China because local firms are more completely embedded into local networks that are 
best positioned to benefit from the role of chance. 
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